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PATENT ELIGIBILITY AND PHYSICALITY IN THE EARLY
HISTORY OF PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE
Ben McEniery*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent times, the courts have been asked to determine whether, and
to what extent, the patent system protects claims to inventions that do not
involve a machine or other physical device and do not involve a physical
transformation of matter from one state to another. It is uncontroversial that
the patent system exists to provide an incentive to encourage the invention
and commercialization of new products and processes and the disclosure by
the patent applicant of information sufficient to enable a person skilled in
the relevant field of technology to reproduce the claimed invention. This
disclosure is the quid pro quo of the patent system; it is the benefit the public receives in exchange for the State bestowing monopoly rights on a private individual.1
There is no dispute that patent law’s incentive function is appropriate
for promoting the invention of new and useful physical machines or other
devices, along with new methods that physically transform matter. However, what is not clear and what the courts are having difficulty grappling with
is whether the concept of patent eligibility is broad enough to encompass
non-physical methods, namely those that do not involve a machine or other
physical device and do not involve a physical transformation of matter from
one state to another.
In this respect, the courts have been charged with formulating rules that
can be used to distinguish between inventions that fall within the scope of
patentable subject matter and unpatentable abstract ideas or principles. The
current state of uncertainty in patentable subject matter jurisprudence is a
result of misguided attempts to construct bright-line rules that can supposedly decide the difficult questions of subject matter eligibility according to §
101 of the Patents Act.2
* BA LLB (Hons) (UQ) LLM (QUT) PhD (QUT), Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law,
Queensland University of Technology; Barrister-at-Law.
1. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare.”).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
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The issue confronting the courts arises now because the world is in the
midst of a shift from the Industrial Age to being a knowledge-based economy of the Information Age.3 Knowledge-based economies are those in
which there is a greater reliance on intellectual capabilities than on physical
inputs or natural resources.4 They are “[those] which are directly based on
the production, distribution, and use of knowledge and information.”5 While
manufactured products and manufacturing processes continue to be, and will
likely always be, of great worth, we recognize that innovation manifests
itself in the reduction of new and useful ideas to specific practical application. As such, the production and manipulation of new kinds of information
and ideas will be of substantial value.
Identifying the scope of patent eligibility at this time is an undertaking
of significant importance and difficulty as inventors seek to challenge the
accepted bounds of patentable subject matter. Doing so is integral to determining whether much of the cutting edge innovation we are likely to witness
in the emerging technology areas of the Information Age of the late twentieth century and beyond will receive the same encouragement as the industrial and manufacturing technologies of previous times.
Examples of the kinds of rapidly advancing technology for which patents are being sought in the infancy of the Information Age can be seen in
recently decided Supreme Court cases, particularly those involving nonphysical inventions that are computer-implemented business methods. The
Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos considered whether a method of hedging
risk in electricity markets is patentable subject matter; the idea was to minimize the input costs of an electricity provider that must sell to consumers at
a fixed rate despite purchasing at a variable rate.6 But in Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, the patents held by Alice Corporation
disclosed a computerized trading platform that eliminates “counterparty” or
“settlement” risk, being the risk that only one party to a financial transaction
performs its obligation to pay, leaving the other party without its principal or
the benefit of the counterparty’s performance.7 Mayo Collaborative Services
v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. concerned a method of medical diagnosis
designed to ensure a patient receives an optimal dose of a pharmaceutical to
maximize the pharmaceutical’s effectiveness and minimize its side effects.
As the Court’s decisions in the cases and the decisions of the courts below

3.
(1996).
4.
5.
6.
7.

See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 18
See id. at 10, 30.
Id. at 7.
561 U.S. 593, 597–99 (2010).
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352, 2359 (2014).
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demonstrate, the difficult issues that arise at the margins of patentable subject matter are not easily solved.8
The starting point for any discussion of the scope of patent eligible subject matter is 35 U.S.C. § 101, which recites four enumerated categories of
patentable subject matter: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”9
While no explicit exclusions follow the broad language of 35 U.S.C. §
101, the Supreme Court has identified three general categories of excluded
matter: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.10 The rationale for these judicially recognized categories of excluded subject matter
is pre-emption, namely that “patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of these building blocks of human ingenuity.”11 Various scholars have argued that these categories of excluded matter
should be applied restrictively so that we do not exclude from the patent
system whole fields of endeavor,12 that we should rely principally on the
other requirements for patentability to preclude undeserving patents,13 and
that we should recognize that § 101 does not impose additional requirements
on patentability.14
The Supreme Court, in Mayo, set down a framework for distinguishing
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
from those that claim applications of those concepts.15 The first asks whether
claims are directed to a patentable concept.16 If they are, the second step
asks whether the additional elements recited in the claim “transform the
nature of the claim” into a patentable application by reciting an “inventive
concept” that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”17 The
8. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294–1295 (2012).
9. Questions of subject matter eligibility pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 are separate to
and distinct from the requirements that, to be patentable, an invention must be novel, nonobvious, and useful. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2015). The invention claimed must also be
described in sufficient detail and enabled so that one with ordinary skill in the subject matter
of the patent can make and use the invention. Id. at § 112.
10. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354.
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (citation
omitted)).
12. E.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 609, 613–614 (2009).
13. E.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1342 (2011).
14. See, e.g., Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 591–93
(2008).
15. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
16. See id. at 1297.
17. Id. at 1294, 1297.
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difficulty lies in identifying when a claimed invention falls into one of these
judicially recognized categories of excluded subject matter, and that difficulty is particularly acute when the patent in question is a method that lacks
a physical embodiment.
While the Supreme Court to some extent addressed the question in
Bilski v. Kappos when it held that the presence of a physical aspect in an
invention is a “clue” indicating patent eligibility, it failed to set clear guidelines that explain the circumstances in which a non-physical invention might
be patentable.18 Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Bilski v.
Kappos, rightfully criticized the Court’s failure in this regard:
The Court, in sum, never provides a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea. Indeed, the Court does not even explain if it is using the machine-or-transformation criteria. The Court essentially asserts its conclusion that petitioners’ application claims an abstract idea. This mode of analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the
correct outcome in this case, but it also means that the Court’s musings
on this issue stand for very little.19

Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have also failed to provide this
guidance, despite finding various non-physical inventions to be patent ineligible.20 The Court’s failure in this regard has meant that while it has rejected
the notion that a physicality requirement is the sole test for determining patent eligibility, it is not clear whether the lack of a physical embodiment in
an invention is being used as a de facto proxy for a finding that an invention
is an abstract idea and therefore unpatentable subject matter.
These difficulties must be resolved in a way that allows the patent system to accommodate both traditional industrial technologies as well as the
new and emerging technologies that are the hallmark of the Information
Age. Because the integral elements of the patent system have been apparent
since its inception, any discernible rationale for its existence is to be found
in both its history and form.21 As Benjamin Cardozo said, “Some conceptions of the law owe their existing form almost exclusively to history.”22
18. See 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010).
19. Id. at 621 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347,
2354 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120
(2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1289 (2012).
21. See BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760–1911, (1999); Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 615, 615 (1959) (“The basic truths
found by the English 400 years ago are still valid today and should continue to influence us in
the interpretation and application of our law, even though it has become greatly refined and
perfected.”); Paul E. Schaafsma, An Economic Overview of Patents, 79 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 241, 242 (1997).
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Indeed, history is an indelible part of the patentable subject matter test.
The term manufacture that is used in 35 U.S.C. § 101 is derived from the
expression, “manner of new manufacture,” which appears in § 6 of the Statute of Monopolies.23 Furthermore, it is clear that the United States patent
system is based upon, adopts, and incorporates many of the features of the
English patent practice that preceded it.24
The history needed to interpret modern laws was considered in the
Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Bilski25 but was not replicated in much
detail in the opinions published by the Supreme Court when it heard the
matter on appeal in Bilski v. Kappos.26 In the Federal Circuit, both Justice
Dyk for the concurrence and Justice Newman in dissent asserted that the
English patent law and practice that preceded the birth of the United States
patent system supported his own view regarding the patent eligibility of
non-physical business methods.27 Justice Dyk expressed the view that “patents registered in England under the Statute of Monopolies before 1793
were limited to articles of manufacture, machines for manufacturing, compositions of matter, and related processes.”28
Justice Newman, in dissent, took the opposite view that the Statute of
Monopolies only prohibited odious monopolies in favor of known industries, trades, products, and processes and that its enactment cannot be used
in support of arguments today against the patenting of business methods and
other non-physical methods.29 Her Honor in expressing this view stated that
“[i]t is apparent that economic, or ‘business method,’ or ‘human activity’
patents were neither explicitly nor implicitly foreclosed from access to the
English patent system.”30
With the purpose of shedding light on the current uncertainty surrounding the patentability of knowledge and information-based method inventions, this article takes up the debate and examines the patent system from
its earliest days in the Republic of Venice and in England to its adoption in
the United States of America and through to the present day. It does so to
demonstrate that the history of patent law and practice supports nonphysical method inventions as being within the bounds of patentable subject
matter.
22. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 52 (1921).
23. Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents.
24. See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18, (1829).
25. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950–52 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
26. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
27. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 985–87, (Dyk, J., Concurring, Newman, J., Dissenting).
28. Id. at 970.
29. Id. at 988–89.
30. Id. at 989.
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THE EARLY HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT LAW

The history of the patent system reveals it to be a tool to promote innovation and economic development. From its earliest days, monopoly protection has been granted to those who disclose new technological advances that
promote the progress of the useful arts. Traditionally, this has been understood as being the domain of the industrial manufacturer, artisan, engineer,
and draftsman.31 This history, coupled with the history of technology’s development, has led to a generally held expectation that patent protection is
limited to innovation embodied in machines or other physical devices of
industrial application and in manufacturing processes that involve manipulating or transforming physical matter.32
However, these traditional conceptions do not necessarily accord with
what is patentable at law. While the patent eligibility of machines and physically transformative methods is evident from the earliest patent cases,33 the
history of patent law by no means restricts the scope of patent eligibility to
the classes of invention these traditional conceptions envisage.
Many significant sources, written mainly in the twentieth century, reveal the early history and rationale of patent law.34 Those sources reveal that
31. Richard H. Stern, Being Within the Useful Arts as a Further Constitutional Requirement for U.S. Patent-Eligibility, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 6, 15 (2009).
32. The King v. Wheeler (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 345 at 349–50 (Eng.); Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (“Industrial processes . . . are the types which have historically
been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.”); LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD
SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 324 (2d ed. 2004) (“[T]he image of the invention
as the human intervention into nature that brings about a resulting physical change that underpins much contemporary jurisprudence, was well entrenched in British law by the midnineteenth century.”).
33. See, e.g., Crane v. Price (1842) 4 Man. & G. 580 (Eng.); The King v. Wheeler
(1819) 2 B. & Ald. 345 (Eng.); Hornblower v. Boulton (1799) 8 T. R. 95 (Eng.); Boulton and
Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 (Eng.).
34. 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1945); HAROLD G.
FOX, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE PATENT
MONOPOLY (1947); CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, THE
ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800 (1988); SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 21; Adam
Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52
HASTINGS L. J. 1255 (2000–2001); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of
Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1787–1836 (Part 2), 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11 (1998); Schaafsma, supra note 21; Edward C. Walterscheid, To
Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1787–1836
(Part 1), 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61 (1997) [hereinafter American Patent Law
(Part 1)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (Part 5, Part II), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 665 (1996) [hereinafter
Antecedents (Part 5ii)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States
Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 5, Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 615 (1996)
[hereinafter Antecedents (Part 5i)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the
United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 4), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 77
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it is often mistakenly thought that the origins of United States patent law and
the legal concepts of invention and inherent patentability lie in the English
Parliament enacting the Statute of Monopolies in 1624.35 In truth, patent
law’s origins predate the Statute of Monopolies and lie in the practice of the
English Crown granting monopoly rights in inventions that arose prior to the
passing of that statute,36 which itself was based on the early patent custom in
the Republic of Venice.37
A.

Early Patent Custom in the Republic of Venice

European patent custom originally developed in the Republic of Venice
from the desire of rulers in the fifteenth century to encourage the development of new industries within their realms.38 The idea of granting monopolies originated in early European commerce to encourage individuals, com(1996) [hereinafter Antecedents (Part 4)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of
the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
771 (1995) [hereinafter Antecedents (Part 3)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution
of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
849 (1994) [hereinafter Antecedents (Part 2)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution
of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
697 (1994) [hereinafter Antecedents (Part 1)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the
Progress of the Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994) [hereinafter
Science and Useful Arts]; Frank D. Prager, Historical Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 309 (1961) [hereinafter Historical Background];
Klitzke, supra note 21; Frank D. Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual
Property, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 106 (1952) [hereinafter The Early Growth]; Frank D. Prager,
A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 711 (1944)
[hereinafter History of Intellectual Property]; P. J. Federico, Origins and Early History of
Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 294 (1929); D. Seaborne Davies, Further Light on The Case of
Monopolies, 48 L. Q. R. 394 (1932); E. Wyndham Hulme, On the History of Patent Law in
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 18 L. Q. R. 280 (1902) [hereinafter History of
Patent Law]; E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative
and at Common Law – A Sequel [hereinafter Sequel], 16 L. Q. R. 44 (1900); E. Wyndham
Hulme, The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at Common Law, 12 L.
Q. R. 141 (1896) [hereinafter History].
35. Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), available at http://www.legis
lation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents.
36. SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 21, at 208–09 (citing W. Mackinnon, Patent Laws,
36 HANSARD COL. 555 (1837)) (“[T]here was ‘no express statute according to which patents
might be granted . . . the granting did not rest upon the foundation of statute law.’”).
37. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 11; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34,
at 704–06.
38. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 11; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34,
at 855–56; Federico, supra note 34, at 292; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note
34, at 704–06; Klitzke, supra note 21; Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J.
OF THE PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 167 (1948) (translated by F.D. Prager); Hulme, Sequel, supra
note 34, at 44–56; Hulme, History, supra note 34, at 141–54.

182

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

panies, and cities to engage in commercial ventures that entailed great risk.
These trading monopolies granted exclusive rights to practice a certain art or
to make, use, or sell a certain article. Their object was the promotion of new
industries that would provide the realm with new and useful products made
domestically without the need to import.39
In Venice, as was the case throughout medieval Europe, commerce was
dominated by guilds.40 Whoever proposed a new technology needed a specially created power or license, called a privilege, in order to make, sell, or
use a new invention or would otherwise contravene existing monopolies
granted in favor of the guilds. The privilege was not necessarily given to an
individual, but could be thrown open to the public, nor was it necessarily
given to the inventor or first importer of a new art.41 A number of these patents were granted, an early example being the famous patent of 1469 granted to John of Speyer, a German printer, to protect the new art of printing
that he introduced to the Republic.42 The patent “decreed . . . that for five
years next following there should be nobody whosoever who would, could,
might or dare exercise said art of book printing in Venice and its territories,
except master John himself.”43 The patent referred to the reservation of exclusive rights “[i]n the same manner as usual in other useful arts.”44 For a
time, patents such as these were issued on a case-by-case basis before a general patent law was implemented.
The application of early patent law in Venice corresponded with the
height of economic prosperity in the Republic from 1400 to 1550. Venice’s
economic prosperity and superiority were due to its being a dominant sea
power in control of the major trade routes.45 That superiority dissolved with
the discovery of new sea routes to the Far East around the Cape of Good

39. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, at 855–56; Federico, supra note
34, at 292.
40. See Prager, History of Intellectual Property, supra note 34, at 713. The guilds were a
group of masters maintaining a monopoly over a particular trade. This control was maintained by fixing prices and standards; trading collectively with other groups; defending their
trade against others, including labourers and foreigners; and providing some security for aged
and disabled members of the guild. Id.
41. Prager, The Early Growth, supra note 34, at 112; Prager, History of Intellectual
Property, supra note 34, at 714–15.
42. Giulio Mandich, Venetian Origins of Inventor’s Rights, 42 J. OF THE PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
378, 381 (1960); Mandich, supra note 38, at 169; Prager, History of Intellectual Property,
supra note 34, at 715, 750.
43. Prager, History of Intellectual Property, supra note 34, at 750. According to Prager,
this was the first known patent of monopoly preserved in the records of Venice, and there is a
remark in the patent that it was a usual practice to grant such monopolies. Id. at 715, 750.
44. Mandich, supra note 42, at 380; Mandich, supra note 38, at 169; Prager, History of
Intellectual Property, supra note 34, at 715, 750.
45. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 710–11.
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Hope at the end of the fifteenth century.46 This marked the reversal of migration of skilled tradesmen and artisans, particularly glass workers, who had in
the past moved to Venice, but later sought other parts of Europe, taking with
them knowledge of Venice’s patent custom. Following this migration, the
use of grants of exclusive rights by governments to encourage inventive
industry emerged concurrently in several areas in Western Europe in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.47
The earliest known general patent law is a Venetian statute of 1474 that
granted a monopoly for ten years to “every person who shall build any new
and ingenious device.”48
WE HAVE among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover ingenious devices; and in view of the grandeur and virtue of our city, more
such men come to us every day from divers parts. Now, if provision
were made for the works and devices discovered by such persons, so that
others who may see them could not build them and take the inventor’s
honor away, more men would then apply their genius, would discover,
and would build devices of great utility and benefit to our commonwealth. Therefore: BE IT ENACTED that, by the authority of this Council, every person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this
City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice of it
to the office of our General Welfare Board when it has been reduced to
perfection so that it can be used and operated. It being forbidden to every
other person in any of our territories and towns to make any further device conforming with and similar to said one, without the consent and license of the author, for the term of ten years. And if anybody builds it in
violation hereof, the aforesaid author and inventor shall be entitled to
have him summoned before any magistrate the said infringer shall be
constrained to pay him hundred ducats; and the device shall be destroyed
at once. It being, however, within the power and discretion of the Government, in its activities, to take and use any such device and instrument,
with this condition however that no one but the author shall operate it.49

46. Id.
47. Id. at 710–11; Prager, History of Intellectual Property, supra note 34, at 720.
48. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 707. While it is generally
regarded that the custom of granting patents originated in Italy, there is some question as to
whether the practice began in Venice or Florence. See id. The Republic of Florence allegedly
issued a patent to the architect and inventor, Filippo Brunelleschi in 1421 for his ship, which
transported the Carraran marble for the dome of the Florentine Duomo; however, it seems the
practice was not continued. BRUCE BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 17–19 (1967).
49. Mandich, supra note 38, at 176–77; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note
34, at 707–09.
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The Venetian patent statute of 1474 contains the fundamental features
of today’s patent system.50 It provides an incentive to invent through the
grant of exclusive rights as an economic tool to encourage technological
progress by prohibiting free-riding to protect the “inventor’s honor” and
presumably economic rights.51 It reveals novelty in protecting newly invented or imported devices not previously known in the city.52 It reveals inventiveness by use of the term “ingenious device.”53 It reveals utility by requiring that a device have “been reduced to perfection so that it can be used and
operated.”54 It provides a form of patent registration (by giving notice of the
invention) that provides a limited monopoly of ten years after which the
device falls into the public domain.55 It reveals an enforcement provision for
actions against infringers that sets out a fine and provides for delivery and
destruction of offending articles.56 It demonstrates that the patentee has the
right to license the patented device but perhaps not to assign it.57 Finally, the
state is given the option of a compulsory license, with the proviso that “no
one but the author shall operate it.”58
As this early Venetian statute specifically provides that rights of exclusivity will be granted to anyone who builds “any new and ingenious device
in this City,” it is clear that the statute is directed to the development of an
innovation system focused around the invention (or importation) of new
physical devices.59 This focus on the need for a physical embodiment in the
subject matter of a patent was arguably a by-product of the conceptions of
technology held at the time, rather than perhaps a hard-and-fast rule for patentability that would last for all of time.
B.

The Early English Patent Custom

The concepts observed in this early Venetian patent practice were
adopted in the later English patent practice as a means of encouraging new
manufacturers to the realm. The origins of modern patent law and the legal
concepts of invention and patentability lie in the custom of the English
Crown awarding monopoly rights by letters patent (literally meaning “open
letters”) in exercise of royal prerogative to produce specific goods or pro50. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 709–10. See Prager, History of
Intellectual Property, supra note 34, at 720; see also BUGBEE, supra note 48, at 24.
51. See Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 708.
52. See id. at 709.
53. See id. at 708–09.
54. See id. at 709.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 709–10.
57. See Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 708–09.
58. See id. at 709. The statute was characterized as “a considerable success.” Id. at 710.
59. See id. at 709.
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vide specific services.60 Patents at that time were not understood to have the
precise and technical meaning that they have acquired over the last 200
years of a grant by the State of monopoly rights to exploit a product or process for a limited period. Rather, the early English patent custom reveals
that letters patent were awarded as a tool of industrial innovation policy designed to bring new trades and industries to the realm by encouraging
skilled foreign workmen to bring their established trades and settle in England.61
C.

Patents Under Queen Elizabeth I

It was not until the reign of Queen Elizabeth I (1558–1603) during the
middle of the sixteenth century, however, that we find a truly modern patent
grant, one that involved the Crown issuing letters patent to individuals for
manufacturing monopolies in accordance with recognized legal principles.62
From early in her reign, Queen Elizabeth I pursued an innovation policy to
enable England to attain economic power and strength relative to other
states by regulating commerce and industry in such a way as to favor the
creation of new industries and trades. This was to be achieved by stimulating the domestic production of raw and manufactured goods and encouraging the creation of local industries to manufacture products that would otherwise have been imported, including by luring foreign skilled workers to

60. Federico, supra note 34, at 292; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34,
at 700–01 (citing William Blackstone, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 316–17
(1768)) (“The king’s . . . grants, whether of land, honors, liberties, franchises, or aught besides, are contained in charters, or letters patent, that is, open letters, literae patentes: so
called, because they are not sealed up, but exposed to open view, with the great seal pendant
at the bottom; and are usually directed or addressed by the king to all his subjects at large.”).
In contrast to the open letters of letters patent were letters close. Monarchs in England did
much of the business of the state by means of charters, letters patent, and letters close. Letters
patent were used to set forth their public directives, whereas letters close were used to provide private instructions to individuals. Id.
61. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 10–11; Schaafsma, supra note 21, at 242; Klitzke,
supra note 21, at 620–25; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, at 851–52;
Federico, supra note 34, 292–93.
62. D. Seaborne Davies argues that under Elizabeth, in 1561, patent law was introduced
in England “as a system.” Davies, supra note 34, at 396–97 (“[T]he Patent System was introduced into England as a system in the second year of Elizabeth’s reign”); James Lahore, The
Legal Rationale of the Patent System, in THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PATENTS IN
AUSTRALIA 11 (1981). Federico attributes the Elizabethan policy of awarding patents of invention to stimulate the introduction of new industries and trades to a petition made to the
Queen in 1559 by the Italian, Giacopo Acontio, that he be protected from those who would
copy certain furnaces and “wheel” machines he had invented. See Federico, supra note 34, at
296–97.
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England.63 Elizabeth’s innovation policy focused on introducing new industries and trades to the realm and avoiding interference with existing industries and trades and the livelihoods of the established workforce.64 This view
is substantiated by Lord Coke’s argument against monopolies made at the
time:
[A] mans trade is accounted his life, because it maintaineth his life; and
therefore the monopolist that taketh away a mans trade, taketh away his
life, and therefore is so much the more odious. 65

For Elizabeth, innovation meant bringing new technology to the realm
(particularly from the Continent), rather than invention as we understand the
meaning of that term today,66 as patents were granted both to new inventors
and those who first introduced an invention into the realm through importation.67 Thus, the early English patent custom reflects mercantilist ideas by
providing incentives to merchants who had the contacts and the capacity to
bring new technologies to England.68
The term “inventor” was used to denote the person importing a new art
into the realm or the first finder or creator of a new product or process, the
rights of the inventor being derived from those of the importer.69 Use of the
phrase “invention and a new trade” was used to mean the importation of a
new trade or industry, whereas the term “discovery” was used to mean what
contemporary language describes as an invention, which is the use of inventive mental facility to produce something new and non-obvious.70
The rule that an inventor included the first importer of patentable ideas
was laid down in the early case of Edgeberry v. Stephens71 and followed in
Boulton and Watt v. Bull.72 In Boulton and Watt v. Bull, Chief Justice Eyre
noted that Edgeberry v. Stephens establishes that “the first introducer of an
invention practised beyond the sea, shall be deemed the first inventor; and it
63. FOX, supra note 34, at 61.
64. Hulme, History, supra note 34, at 151–52; Hulme, Sequel, supra note 34, at 44;
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 314–43; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34,
at 855–59; Klitzke, supra note 21, at 622–25; MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 12–13, 18.
65. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND CONCERNING HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER PLEAS OF CROWN AND CRIMINAL CLAUSES 181 (1797).
66. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 11 (“Acquisition of superior Continental technology
was the predominant motive for the issue of patents under the guidance of Elizabeth I’s chief
minister, William Cecil, later Lord Burghley.”).
67. See Edgeberry v. Stephens (1697) 2 Salk. 447 (Eng.); Boulton and Watt v. Bull
(1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 (Eng.) (following the Edgeberry v. Stephens decision); see also Moser v.
Marsden (1893) R.P.C. 350 at 350–51 (Eng.)
68. Hulme, History, supra note 34, at 151–52.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 151–53, 280–81.
71. (1697) 2 Salk. 447 (Eng.).
72. (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 (Eng.).
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is there said the act is intended to encourage new devices useful to the kingdom and whether acquired by travel or study, it is the same thing.”73
Encouraging entrepreneurs to assume the costs and risks associated
with introducing a new industry or trade required a powerful incentive in the
form of the potential to earn a substantial economic return without causing
substantial costs to be incurred by the Crown.74 Thus, patents were not
awarded in recognition of some natural right in favor of an inventor to control the use of his or her ideas.75 Instead, monopolies were primarily granted
for the importation of new industries, and many were given to aliens or naturalized subjects of the Crown.76
While many of the grants made under the exercise of royal prerogative
by Elizabeth I and her successor to the throne, James I, were genuinely intended to encourage new and useful arts,77 many were said to be an abuse of
that power to reward royal favorites.78 It was alleged that the Crown granted
monopolies for the making or importing of products regardless of whether
the patentee was the inventor or had brought a new product into the realm. 79
Often these monopolies were granted in relation to commodities already in
use. Sometimes monopolies were created over necessities such as salt,
starch, saltpetre, paper, and glass, thereby harming the existing trade in
known commodities.80 According to one commentator, “[t]he financial returns to the Crown were at the most negligible, and, while it may be admitted that fiscal policy and the hope of raising revenue were contributing factors, they were not the main nor even an important motivating force.”81 Others have argued that the complaints against the patent system “were a result
of a decline in prosperity in the last decade of the sixteenth century, and the
first impulse was to seek redress from real or imaginary abuses” including
the grant of monopolies.82
73. Id. at 491.
74. See Marsden v. Saville Street Co. (1878) L.R. Exch. 203 at 206 (Eng.); Plimpton v.
Malcolmson (1876) Ch.D. 531 at 555–56 (Eng.); In re Wirth’s Patent (1879) Ch.D. 303 at
304 (Eng.); In re Avery’s Patent (1887) Ch.D. 307 at 316–17 (Eng.).
75. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 53; Mossoff, supra note 34, at 1256–57.
76. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 11; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34,
at 855–57; Hulme, History, supra note 34, at 151–52.
77. Schaafsma, supra note 21, at 245.
78. BUGBEE, supra note 48, at 36–37; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 346–47;
Schaafsma, supra note 21, at 245; Lahore, supra note 62, at 11; Federico, supra note 34, at
299.
79. BUGBEE, supra note 48, at 36–37; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 346–47;
Schaafsma, supra note 21, at 245; Lahore, supra note 62, at 11; Federico, supra note 34, at
299.
80. BUGBEE, supra note 48, at 36–37.
81. FOX, supra note 34, at 188.
82. Chris Dent, Patent Policy in Early Modern England: Jobs, Trade and Regulation, 10
AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 71, 75 (2006).
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Outrage over the Crown’s perceived abuses was expressed in 1601 during Elizabeth’s last Parliament. The struggle that ensued between Parliament
and the Queen was one of the most significant in English constitutional history. At stake were the royal prerogative and its preeminence over the power
of Parliament. The struggle was temporarily stayed when Elizabeth I issued
a proclamation in Parliament that revoked a great number of objectionable
patents and gave the common law courts the power to determine the validity
of monopolies granted by the Crown.83 Her Majesty thereby abandoned her
claim to settle disputes arising from the grant privileges under the royal prerogative and even showed indignation that she had been tricked into making
such grants.84
That, however, was not the end of the matter, as the common law was
soon called upon to address the issue. It was the grant to a groom of Queen
Elizabeth’s Privy Chamber, Edward Darcy, that led to the first common law
judicial decision to challenge the nature of the Crown’s power to grant monopolies and the nature and power of the royal prerogative.85 The case was
Darcy v. Allen (also known as The Case on Monopolies).86
Darcy v. Allen involved the grant of an exclusive right issued in 1598
to Edward Darcy to manufacture, import, and sell playing cards in England
and its dominions, even though the manufacture of playing cards was an
established industry.87 When Allen, a London haberdasher, infringed the
patent, Darcy brought suit.88 Allen admitted selling the cards, but pleaded a
right to do so.89 It was argued on behalf of the patentee that the Crown had
the sole prerogative in matters of pleasure and recreation and that the grant
had been given to control the number of playing cards in circulation and the
time spent by servants and apprentices playing cards.90 The King’s Bench
decided the case in the Easter term of 1603 after the Queen’s death in

83. BUGBEE, supra note 48, at 37.
84. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 348–49; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra
note 34, at 866–67.
85. Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.
J. 1261, 1261 (1996).
86. Id. at 1261–62 (“Darcy v. Allen’s fame is largely due to the reports of Edward
Coke.”). Coke appeared as Attorney General before the Kings Bench in Darcy v. Allen, was
one of the reporters of the case, and was involved in drafting of the Statute of Monopolies. Id.
at 1262. Two other reports exist in Moore’s English Reports and Noy’s English Reports. Id.
at 1261, n.1.
87. Corré, supra note 85, at 1261.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1272–73.
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1602.91 A verdict against Edward Darcy in favor of the defendant, Allen,
was given.92
No written opinions were given, and in the absence of reasons, counsel’s argument for the defense was reported in full and is regarded as being
representative of the court’s reasoning.93 The case report reveals that, as a
rule, monopolies were stated to be generally contrary to law because they do
not benefit the realm, they raise prices, and they reduce the merchantability
of goods and reduce employment.94
However, the defendant’s argument expressed one exception to the rule
against monopolies that has become a classic principle. That exception was
made in favor of monopolies for invention and importation, limited in duration:
[W]hen any man by his own charge and industry, or by his own wit and
invention doth bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending
to the furtherance of a trade that never was used before; and that for the
good of the realm;—in such cases the king may grant to him a monopoly-patent for some reasonable time, until the subjects may learn the
same, in consideration of the good he doth bring by his invention to the
commonwealth, otherwise not.95

These arguments reflect the common law principles relating to monopolies and have formed the basis of patent systems in England, its dominions,
the United States, and many other foreign states.96
The Clothworkers of Ipswich, decided in 1615, was the second important case decided before the passing of the Statute of Monopolies. 97 The
case involved a claim made by a group of tailors incorporated and chartered
by King James I to conduct their business in Ipswich against a tailor who
was not part of the corporation but practiced his trade in the town.98 The
court stated that the Crown could create corporations with power to make
ordinances governing trade, but the power granted did not extend to the creation of a monopoly harmful to free trade:
[I]t was agreed by the Court, that the King might make corporations . . .
but thereby they cannot make a monopoly for that is to take away freetrade, which is the birthright of every subject. . . . But if a man hath
91. Id. at 1267.
92. Id.
93. See Corré, supra note 85, at 1267–72.
94. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, at 868.
95. Federico, supra note 34, at 301; Lahore, supra note 62, at 12.
96. Lahore, supra note 62, at 11–12.
97. (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147. (The case is otherwise known as The Case of the Taylors
of Ipswich).
98. Id. at 147–48.
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brought in a new invention and a new trade within the kingdom, in peril
of his life, and consumption of his estate or stock, &c. or if a man hath
made a new discovery of any thing, in such cases the King of his grace
and favor, in recompence of his costs and travail, may grant by charter
unto him, that he only shall use such a trade or trafique for a certain time,
because at first the people of the kingdom are ignorant, and have not the
knowledge or skill to use it: but when that patent is expired, the King
cannot make a new grant thereof: for when the trade is become common,
and others have been bound apprentices in the same trade, there is no
reason that such should be forbidden to use it.99

The judgment contains all the conditions necessary for the grant of letters patent in the mid sixteenth century: the justification for the monopoly is
that new industries are introduced into the realm and that no monopoly can
issue for preexisting industries; the monopoly rewards the labor and costs of
the inventor; the patentee is to train Englishmen in the trade; and that patents
are royal grants of privilege given solely for the purpose of achieving policy
objectives based upon the common good.100
D.

The Statute of Monopolies

James I, who succeeded Elizabeth in 1603 shortly before Darcy v. Allen was decided, was caught in the same struggle on the question of monopolies as his predecessor. His needs and those of his courtiers demanded that
patents be freely granted, while Parliament, in contrast, demanded their regulation. Notwithstanding the outcome in Darcy v. Allen, James continued
issuing odious monopolies over existing trades and products. In the face of
continuing political pressure, James issued in 1610 a “Declaration of His
Majesty’s Pleasure,” which became known as the Book of Bounty, which is
said to have provided a statement acknowledging the common law principles arising from the reports in Darcy v. Allen.101
Shortly thereafter, in May 1624, Parliament enacted the Statute of Monopolies.102 The Statute of Monopolies reflected the common law’s suspicion of monopolies but recognized nonetheless that monopolies limited in
duration have the potential to serve the public interest by providing an incentive to invent. The principal purpose of the Statute of Monopolies was to

99. Id. at 252–53.
100. Mossoff, supra note 34, at 1270.
101. FOX, supra note 34, at 96–97.
102. 1623, 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents.
(The Statute of Monopolies is the short title of the Act. The long title is “An Act Concerning
Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws and the Forfeiture Thereof.”)
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declare all grants of monopolies void, other than patents for invention,
which it allowed for a limited duration.103
From a constitutional perspective, the Statute of Monopolies represents
an incredible assertion of parliamentary power and an assertion that the
Kingdom was to be ruled by common law, rather than royal prerogative.
The object of passing the Statute of Monopolies is said to be the curtailment
of the practice of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in
goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public, a
practice considered to be contrary to the common law.104 Thus, the Statute of
Monopolies was little more than a declaration of the common law principles
then in existence with the exceptions that it fixed a maximum term of fourteen years and transferred jurisdiction for hearing patent disputes from the
Exchequer to the common law courts.105
Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies sets out the exception in favor
of patents for invention and the conditions to be satisfied in order for a patent to be granted:
[Monopolies] shall not extend to any tres Patents and Graunt of Privilege
for the tearme of fowerteene yeares or under, hereafter to be made of the
sole working or makinge of any manner of new Manufactures within this
Realme, to the true and first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the tyme of makinge such tres Patents and Graunts
shall not use, soe as alsoe they be not contrary to the Lawe nor mischievous to the State, by raisinge prices of Commodities at home, or hurt of
Trade, or generallie inconvenient . . . .106

The Statute of Monopolies, by making reference to a “grant of privilege,” did not change the position at law of applicants, who did not have a
right to be granted a patent and were not granted property rights but were in
the position of a petitioner seeking the monarch’s favor. Likewise, the words
“true and first inventor” referred to the person responsible for the introduc103. Id. at § 1. The Statute of Monopolies provides that the central objective of the statute
is to encourage free trade and competition by rendering void all monopolies, including those
granted under the authority of letters patent. Section 1 provides: “All [Monapolies] and all
Commissions Graunts Licences Charters and tres patents heretofore made or graunted or
hereafter to be made or graunted to any person or persons Bodies Politique or Corporate
whatsoever of or for the sole buyinge sellinge markinge workinge or usinge of any thinge
within this Realme . . . are altogether contrary to the Lawes of this Realme, and so are and
shalbe utterlie void and of none effecte.” Id.
104. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
105. FOX, supra note 34, at 118; Justine Pila, The Common Law Invention in its Original
Form, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 209, 223 (2001); Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note
34, at 876 n.111 (stating Coke favored a term limited to one apprenticeship period of seven
years); Lahore, supra note 48, at 15; Hulme, Sequel, supra note 34, at 44; Hulme, History,
supra note 34, at 151–54; Federico, supra note 34, at 302–04.
106. 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 § 6 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents.
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tion of the invention into England. Coke, writing contemporaneously, explained the reasoning behind the sort of monopoly permitted by section 6 of
the Statute of Monopolies as being “because the inventor bringeth to and for
the Commonwealth a new manufacture by his invention, cost and charges,
and therefore it is reason, that he should have a privilege for his reward (and
the encouragement of others in the like) for a convenient time.” 107 Here we
have a contemporaneous statement of one involved in the drafting and passage of the Act that describes the incentive function of patent law. In fact, it
is clear that even from these early times there was an inextricable link between offerings of rewards and incentives to bring new inventions to the
realm.
According to law set out in Darcy v. Allen, patents could only be invalidated if they were generally inconvenient for interfering with established
industries and trades.108 These requirements were adopted in the language of
the Statute of Monopolies. The Statute of Monopolies did not narrow or
eliminate categories of eligible subject matter. It only addressed patent
abuses by prohibiting the grant of odious monopolies over known trades. In
doing so, it left the existing common law intact.109
The focus of the Statute of Monopolies is thus on ensuring that patents
are only issued for new trades that had not in recent times been practiced in
the realm at the time the patent was applied for.110 This is seen in the subject
matter requirement that a monopoly could only be granted in respect of “any
manner of new Manufactures” for the reason that a monopoly in respect of a
new industry or trade would not be, in the words of section 6, “contrary to
the Lawe nor mischievous to the State, by raising prices of Commodities at
home, or hurt of Trade, or generallie inconvenient.”111
The wording of section 6 also contains an implicit reference to utility,
in the form of a requirement that the claimed invention be capable of being
performed (or that it work).112 While the more modern and additional strictures of patentability in the form of a requirement of inventiveness and a
requirement that the applicant describe the subject matter of the patent in a
written patent specification would come later, the wording of the section and
107. COKE, supra note 65, at 184 (altered for readability) (explaining the reasoning behind
the sort of monopoly permitted by section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies).
108. Corré, supra note 85, at 1263.
109. See Prager, Historical Background, supra note 34, at 313 (“The statute said nothing
about meritorious functions of patents, nothing about patent disclosures, and nothing about
patent procedures; it was only directed against patent abuses.”); Klitzke, supra note 21, at
649; see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6.
110. See generally Hulme, History of Patent Law, supra note 34, at 281–88.
111. Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation
.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents.
112. Id.
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contemporaneous documents that described its operation make no reference
to categorical subject matter exclusions. 113
Therefore, it cannot be said that the Statute of Monopolies restricts the
kinds of new processes that can be patentable today merely because it outlawed patents on non-novel businesses in England. As such, business methods, non-physical methods, or methods of organizing human activity were
not removed from the scope of patentability by the passing of the Statute of
Monopolies.114
The Statute of Monopolies governed English patent law for more than
200 years, and it was not until the passing of the Patent Law Amendment Act
1852 (UK) that England received significant patent law legislation. The
Statute of Monopolies, however, continued to be of relevance as it was
never repealed and, by reference, expressly formed the basis of the patentable subject matter standard in United Kingdom patent law statutes until
1977 when the United Kingdom abandoned its Statute of Monopolies-based
regime in favor of a patent system based on the European Patent Convention.115
E.

Disclosure of the Invention: Consideration for a Patent

In patent law’s infancy, the consideration required for the grant of a patent was the creation of a new industry or device and knowledge given to the
public by the establishment of an industry in the realm or by training apprentices who would later be able to work the trade or industry under the
patentee or independently on the expiration of the patent. Patents were not

113. See generally Liardet v. Johnson (1780), 1 Y. & C.C.C. 526 at 528 (Eng.) (recognizing the common law requirement of a written specification to accompany a patent application).
114. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 984–89 (Newman, J.,dissenting) (providing a nearcomplete list of patents granted between 2 March 1617 and 1 October 1852 with a few missing patents from the 17th century, which was published in the mid-1800s by Bennet Woodcroft, the first head of the English Patent Office. Newman pointed to a number of patents on
that list (apparently without having examined them) that appear to involve financial subject
matter and require primarily human activity. Those her Honor identified are: No. 1197 to
John Knox (July 21, 1778) (“Plan for assurances on lives of persons from 10 to 80 years of
age.”); No. 1170 to John Molesworth (Sept. 29, 1777) (“Securing to the purchasers of shares
and chances of state-lottery tickets any prize drawn in their favor.”); No. 1159 to William
Nicholson (July 14, 1777) (“Securing the property of persons purchasing shares of Statelottery tickets.”). Id. (citing Bennet Woodcroft, ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF PATENTEES OF
INVENTIONS 383, 410 (U.S. ed. 1969)); See also D.F. Renn, John Knox’s Plan for Insuring
Lives: A Patent of Invention in 1778, 101 J. INST. ACTUARIES 285, 285 (1974).
115. See generally, Convention on the Grant of European Patents 1977, 13 I.L.M. 268
(EU). The current legislation in the United Kingdom, Patents Act 1977 (UK), (making no
reference to the Statute of Monopolies).
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required to contain a description of the invention, either in writing or diagrammatic form.116
While the Statute of Monopolies makes no demand for a disclosure of
the invention in writing, a few of the early seventeenth century patents contained a specification made by the patentee, for the patentee’s benefit, to
clarify the scope of the monopoly. Soon a custom of presenting a detailed
description of the invention in a specification arose, before being mandated
by the courts by the middle of the eighteenth century.117 The need for a written specification accompanying the patent application was recognized at
common law in 1778 in Liardet v. Johnson, where Lord Justice Mansfield
directed the jury:
The third point is whether the specification is such as instructs others to
make it. For the condition of giving encouragement is this: that you must
specify upon record your invention in such a way as shall teach an artist,
when your term is out, to make it—and to make it as well as you by your
directions; for then at the end of the term, the public have the benefit of it.
The inventor has the benefit during the term, and the public have the benefit
after.118
By the end of the eighteenth century, it had become settled law that the
consideration for the patent was not the working of the invention per se, but
the disclosure of how to make and use the invention.119 In Boulton and Watt
v. Bull, Justice Buller declared that “[t]he specification is the price which the
patentee is to pay for the monopoly.”120 Consequently, the utility requirement evolved from the question of whether the invention was capable of
successful introduction in the realm to whether it could be worked in the
manner and so as to achieve the results described in the specification.121
The decision in Liardet v. Johnson was also instructive on the need for
an invention to be novel and what that requirement entailed. According to
Lord Mansfield, an allegation of want of novelty had to “be supported either
116. See Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, at 860; Hulme, History of
Patent Law, supra note 34, at 285.
117. See Federico, supra note 34, at 304; see also Hulme, History of Patent Law, supra
note 34, at 285.
118. See Federico, supra note 34, at 304; Hulme, History of Patent Law, supra note 34, at
285.
119. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 3), supra note 34, at 801; Hulme, History of Patent
Law, supra note 34, at 287.
120. Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 472 (Eng.). The judgment of Lord
Chief Justice Eyre also stated that “[t]he modern cases have chiefly turned upon the specifications, whether there was a fair disclosure.” Id. at 491.
121. Turner v. Winter (1787) 1 T. R. 601 at 604 (Eng.); The King v. Arkwright (1785) 1
Web. Pat. Cas. 64 at 66 (Eng.); Morgan v. Seaward (1837) 2 M. & W. 544 at 548 (Eng.);
Liardet v. Johnson (1870) 1 Y. & C.C.C. 526 at 528 (Eng.); Hill v. Thompson (1818) 8
Taunt. 373 at 387 (Eng.); Lewis v. Marling (1829) 4 Car. & P. 53 at 55.
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by proof of continuous and successful prior use of the invention” or proof
“that the subject matter of the invention was common knowledge in the
trade”.122
F.

Uncertainty Regarding Processes During the Industrial Revolution

Identifying a historically consistent view of the objects of the patent
system is difficult due to the state of uncertainty that existed within English
patent law until the mid nineteenth century. It is reported that 150 years after
the Statute of Monopolies was enacted, the English patent registers were
brimming with patents claiming processes, even though it was not clear
whether these were patentable.123
One of the first judicial actions involving the scope of patentable subject matter was the 1795 decision of Boulton and Watt v. Bull. As patents
were not litigated in the common law courts until the Privy Council authorized such suits in 1752, judicial interpretation of various aspects of patent
law were essentially absent until Boulton and Watt v. Bull was handed
down.124 This lack of judicial guidance as to the scope and content of the
notion of “manufacture” was acknowledged by Chief Justice Eyre who said,
“Patent rights are no where, that I can find, accurately described in our
books.”125
At issue was the validity of patent in respect to a new method of using
an existing steam engine devised by James Watt, which lessened steam and
fuel consumption.126 Watt’s improvement was to have the condenser in a
separate vessel from the steam cylinder. The method was described in the

122. Hulme, History of Patent Law, supra note 34, at 287.
123. Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 494–95 (Eng.) (“Probably I do not
over-rate it when I state that two-thirds, I believe I might say three-fourths, of all patents
granted since the statute passed, are for methods of operating and of manufacturing, producing no new substances and employing no new machinery.”); Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part
2), supra note 34, at 856 (“As one of the earliest texts on the patent law stated in 1806: ‘most
of the patents now taken out, are by name, for the method of doing particular things . . . ‘”.).
124. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 61; See also Mossoff, supra note 34, at 1262–63, n.26.
According to Mossoff, the prerogative court of Privy Council was invested with jurisdiction
to heard patent disputes as early as 1562. Id. Mossoff further records that Privy Council divested to the law courts jurisdiction over determining the validity of patents for inventions;
thus putting into effect, albeit 130 years late, section 2 of the Statute of Monopolies. Id. at
1285.
125. See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 491 (Eng.); See also Wood v.
Zimmer (1815) Eng. Rep. 58 at 61 (Eng.) (“The subject of patents for new inventions has not
been treated with due precision, as a branch of law by itself, in any of our law books. It is
only indeed within a few years that they have become so important a part of our commercial
machinery.”).
126. See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 463–64, 495–96 (Eng.).
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specification as the application of certain principles of nature in a way to
achieve its purpose.127
The bench of four was equally divided as to the patent’s validity. Chief
Justice Eyre and Justice Rooke held the patent to be valid, while Justices
Heath and Buller took the opposite view. For Justices Heath and Buller, it
was the presence of a physical substance or object that was the basis of an
invention being something other than an unpatentable abstract principle.128
In contrast, Chief Justice Eyre considered that the expression “any manner
of new manufacture” used in the Statute of Monopolies bore a much wider
meaning.129
While each of the judges agreed that there can be no patent for a mere
principle, there were differences of opinion as to what this means. Chief
Justice Eyre described a principle as being an “abstract notion,” as distinct
from a “practical manner of doing,” while for Justices Rooke and Buller, it
was an elementary truth of the arts and sciences.130 Justice Heath was alone
in taking the view that the prohibition on patenting principles extends to
preclude patenting methods of production and even patents on the application of a principle.131
The involvement of some physical substance was for Justices Heath
and Buller the basis for determining whether a claimed invention is something more than a mere principle. According to Justice Heath, the term
“manufacture” is reducible to two physical classes: vendible machines or
(chemical) substances.132 Justice Heath took the view that, unless the method
resulted in a vendible machine or substance, the method was not patentable,
and if it did so result, the patent would be for the vendible machine or substance and not for the method.133 He opined that “patents for chemical processes” are in truth “for a vendible substance.”134 Justice Buller took the
same view, stating that the scope of patentable subject matter extends only
as far as inventions embodied in mechanical and chemical forms.135
In contrast, Chief Justice Eyre made clear that he did not favor a physicality requirement. He held that new manufactures are things made, the
practice of making (thereby endorsing the patentability of processes), and
principles reduced to practice in a new manner (thereby endorsing the pa-

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 496.
Id. at 483, 485–86.
Id. at 492–96.
Id. at 478, 486, 495–96.
Id. at 482–83.
See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 481–82 (Eng.).
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 485–86.
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tentability of non-physical processes).136 Justice Eyre described “the practice
of making” broadly as to include “any art producing effects useful to the
public.”137 Chief Justice Eyre noted that a patent for a method involving no
new mechanism and producing no new result would necessarily be for the
method itself, that is, for the “method detached from all physical existence
whatever.”138
Both the Chief Justice and Justice Rooke indicated that patent eligibility turns on a principle being reduced to a specific practical application capable of producing effects that are of benefit to the public.139 This is a position that is as true today as it was then and leaves open the possibility that
non-physical inventions have been recognized as being patentable since the
earliest judicial consideration of the subject matter eligibility standard.
Justice Rooke saw no difficulty with process patents or patents to improvements on existing technologies.140 He allowed the patent by focusing
on the mechanical nature of the improvement, having determined that the
invention claimed is more than a mere principle. Rather, Justice Rooke considered the claimed invention to be a principle reduced to a practical application.141 He said nothing to indicate that producing a physical effect or
causing a physical transformation of matter is what distinguishes the abstract from the non-abstract.
When James Watt’s steam engine patent was re-litigated in an action
on the case four years later in Hornblower v. Boulton, the court unanimously
upheld the patent and confirmed the reasons and decision of Chief Justice
Eyre, rejecting any assertion that the patent claimed a philosophical principle.142 In that case, Chief Justice Kenyon broadly described the concept of
manufacture as pertaining to, or the equivalent of “something made by the
hands of man.”143 Justice Grose was of a similar view finding that the patent
was “not a patent for a mere principle, but for the working and making of a
new manufacture within the words and meaning of the statute.”144
136. Id. at 492–93.
137. Id. at 492.
138. See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 494 (Eng.).
139. Id. at 477–78, 496–97.
140. Id. at 478–79.
141. Id. at 479–80.
142. (1799) 8 T. R. 95 at 98 (Eng.).
143. Id. at 99 (“But having now heard everything that can be said on the subject, I have
no doubt in saying that this is a patent for a manufacture, which I understand to be something
made by the hands of man.”).
144. Id. at 101. Watt’s steam engine patent was extended for 25 years by an Act of Parliament in 1775 by 15 Geo. III c. 61: An Act for vesting in James Watt, engineer, his executors, administrators, and assigns, the sole use and property of certain steam engines, commonly called fire engines, of his invention, described in the said Act throughout His Majesty’s
dominions, for a limited time.
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The distinction between patentable manufactures and unpatentable
principles made in Boulton and Watt v. Bull and Hornblower v. Boulton was
confirmed in The King v. Wheeler, a case that concerned a method of drying
and preparing malt that involved no new machine.145 While the patent was
declared void because the specification did not adequately describe the
claimed invention, Chief Justice Abbott gave some consideration to the concept of manufacture:
Now the word ‘manufactures’ has been generally understood to denote
either a thing made, which is useful for its own sake, and vendible as
such, as a medicine, a stove, a telescope, and many others, or to mean an
engine or instrument, or some part of an engine or instrument, to be employed, either in the making of some previously known article, or in
some other useful purpose, as a stocking frame, or a steam engine for
raising water for mines. Or it may perhaps extend also to a new process
to be carried on by known implements, or elements, acting upon known
substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance, but
producing it in a cheaper or more expeditious manner, or of a better and
more useful kind. But no merely philosophical or abstract principle can
answer to the word ‘manufactures’. Something of a corporeal and substantial nature, something that can be made by man from the matters subjected to his art and skill, or at the least some new mode of employing
practically his art and skill, is requisite to satisfy this word. 146

From three distinct exemplars of patentable subject matter identified in
the final sentence of this excerpt, it is clear Chief Justice Abbott considered
the distinction between patentable subject matter and an unpatentable philosophical or abstract principle as involving something other than a physicality requirement.
Despite the differences of opinion they contain, the enduring effect of
Boulton and Watt v. Bull, Hornblower v. Boulton, and The King v. Wheeler
is the idea that there is no place for a physicality requirement in the scope of
patentable subject matter and that a lack of physical embodiment in an invention is not to be equated with a claimed invention being a mere abstract
or philosophical principle.
At the time, though, the differences in opinion in those cases led to uncertainty as to what the scope of patentable subject matter in England was.
That uncertainty is evident in the choices made by the founders of the United States patent system.

145. (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 345 at 345 (Eng.).
146. The King v. Wheeler, (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 345 at 349–52 (Eng.).
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The Emergence of Patent Law in the United States

Shortly after gaining independence, the United States established its
own national patent regime, independent of the early English patent tradition
and the Statute of Monopolies. The first United States Federal Patent Act,
the Act of 1790, was largely based on and incorporated features of the English system.147 Justice Story, in Pennock v. Dialogue, acknowledged the influence of the English practice on these early patent laws:
It is obvious to the careful inquirer, that many of the provisions of our
patent act are derived from the principles and practice which have prevailed in the construction of that of England. . . . The language of [the
patent clause of the Statute of Monopolies] is not, as we shall presently
see, identical with ours; but the construction of it adopted by the English
courts, and the principles and practice which have long regulated the
grants of their patents, as they must have been known and are tacitly referred to in some of the provisions of our own statute, afford materials to
illustrate it.148

Against the backdrop of the English system, the Framers of the United
States Constitution, at the end of the eighteenth century, explicitly tied patentability to the purpose of advancing “useful arts.”149 In pursuance of this
objective the Constitution of the United States authorized the United States
Congress to grant exclusive rights to “Inventors” in respect of their “Discoveries.”150 The United States Congress has legislative power to make laws
with respect to patents by virtue of the “intellectual property clause” in the,
Constitution of the United States, which empowers the Congress:
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.151

One of the reasons for this departure from “manufactures” in favor of
the “useful arts” was the view that “even in Great Britain the phrase ‘new
147. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (noting that first
patent statute was written against the backdrop of English monopoly practices); Walterscheid,
Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 698.
148. 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829).
149. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 976–77 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943,985–89 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Walterscheid, Science and Useful Arts, supra note 34, at 12–13,
33–36; George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 6, 6
(1936); It is also arguable that the United States patent system has its origins in the very first
patent system in the Venetian Republic in 1474. See generally Mandich, supra note 38;
Mandich, supra note 42.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
151. Id.
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manufactures’ was unduly limiting for a patent system because it seemed to
exclude new processes.”152
The United States Congress passed its first patent statute in 1790 and
its second in 1793. The first patent statute in 1790 was largely based on and
incorporated features of the English patent system, as was the 1793 Act.153
Patents under the 1790 Act were granted by the executive rather than by
Acts enacted by the legislative branch. The four enumerated categories of
patentable subject matter established by the 1793 Act (art, machine, manufacture, and composition of matter) remained essentially unchanged until
1952, when Congress amended § 101 by replacing the word “art” with “process” and defining that term in § 100 (b).154 The Supreme Court has made
clear that this change did not alter the substance of the statute; it did not
broaden the scope of patentable subject matter.155
Both the 1790 and the 1793 Acts adopted a fourteen-year patent term
and required the inventor to file a written specification describing the invention claimed.156 However, in the United States the patent right has never
been predicated upon importation and has never been limited to “manufactures.”157
In the United States it is the language of Congress that dictates what is
patentable, rather than history or the common law of England.158 As the Supreme Court noted in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, “[O]ur obligation is to take

152. Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 53–54 (1949).
153. See Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 698. This is reflected in
the Senate Committee Report for the bill that became the 1790 Act, which expressly noted
the drafters’ reliance on the English practice found in the Senate Committee Report Accompanying Proposed Amendments to HR 41. Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789
& 1790 Relating to the First Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 352, 363
(1940) (“The Bill depending before the House of Representatives for the Promotion of useful
Arts is framed according to the Course of Practice in the English Patent Office”); Pennock v.
Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Siffel Co., 376 U.S. 255,
229, n.6 (1964) (“Much American patent law derives from English patent law.”). Before the
enactment of 1790 Patent Act, patents were granted by congress. See Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
376 U.S. at 227.
154. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323 (1793); Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66
Stat. 797 (1952).
155. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182–83 (1981).
156. Patent Act of 1793 § 1.
157. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1824) (discussing that patents are not
awarded in the United States to someone who is not an “inventor,” excluding importers);
Prager, Historical Background, supra note 34, at 309; Klitzke, supra note 21, at 638 (stating
that in Elizabethan times, novelty only required that “the industry had not been carried on
within the realm within a reasonable period of time,” while today “the proof of a single public sale of an article” or a “printed publication” can destroy novelty).
158. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
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statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the legislative
history and statutory purpose.”159
Given that the Framers did not use the word “manufacture” in the Constitution to describe the subject matter of patents as they might have done
had they intended to merely incorporate the English law as it was at that
time, it is conceivable, although there is no real evidence for this, that the
Framers intended the reference to “useful arts” to signal an expansive scope
of patentable subject matter to remove the uncertainty that surrounded the
scope of patent protection offered in England in relation to the patentability
of processes.160
The four enumerated categories of patentable subject matter found in
United States patent legislation shows a deliberate choice between competing views prevalent in England at the time of their adoption in the 1793 Patent Act; these four categories were either drawn from the Statute of Monopolies and the common law refinement of its interpretation or were intended to resolve competing views in England at the time.161
Arguably, the inclusion of the category of “manufacture” in 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 manifests an intention to incorporate into United States practice as
much of the common law interpretation of “new manufactures” as was then
understood but not to limit the scope of patentable subject matter in the
United States to that which could be patented in England. It would appear
that the inclusion by Congress of any “art” or “process” in the patent system
was a deliberate clarification of the English practice, confirming the patentability of methods.162
159. Id. at 315.
160. Lutz, supra note 152, at 53–54. As noted above, this uncertainty stems from the fact
that judicial interpretations of various aspects of patent law were virtually absent from the
common law in England until after the Privy Council finally authorized patent suits to be
heard in the common law courts in 1752 and the first case involving questions about the
scope of patentable subject matter was not resolved until Boulton and Watt v. Bull was handed down in 1795. See supra Part F.
161. See Walterscheid, American Patent Law (Part 1), supra note 34, at 67–71.
162. The 1793 Act explicitly included “any new and useful art,” in the list of categories
of patentable subject matter, a usage that was carried forward until “art” was replaced with
“process” in 35 U.S.C. §101 and defined in §100(b) in 1952. See Patent Act of 1793 § 1; Act
of July 19, 1952, § 100. The inclusion of any “art” or “process” appears to have been a deliberate clarification of a question then unresolved in English law as to whether a process or an
improvement of an existing invention is patentable, a question not addressed in England until
the decision in Boulton and Watt v. Bull was brought down in 1795 and not confirmed until
Hornblower v. Boulton in 1799. See Lutz, supra note 152, at 53–54. That the issue to be
litigated in Boulton and Watt v. Bull was in the minds of those sitting in Congress in 1793
was likely given that the case came before the Chief Justice at sittings after Trinity term (the
term beginning after Easter) in 1793. See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 464
(Eng.). Thus, it would appear that Congress broadened the field of patent eligibility from
“new manufactures” to “useful arts” to avoid the possible complication that the English
phrase was unduly limited. Lutz, supra note 152, at 153–54.
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Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. The first is that the
English patenting practice that preceded the establishment of a United States
patent system is of relevance. The second is that the scope of patentable
subject matter in the United States ought not be narrower than that in England at the time the United States patent system came into being.
H.

Emergence of the Inventive Step Requirement

Of the contemporary requirements of patentability,163 only novelty (in
the sense of prior use rather than prior publication) was recognized in England prior to 1623.164 Obviousness (or lack of an inventive step) was not
clearly recognized as a separate ground of invalidity until late in the nineteenth century, and the clear distinctions drawn today between lack of novelty, obviousness and lack of subject matter in a claimed invention were not
fully developed in the case law as it stood in 1900.165 As the High Court of
Australia noted in National Research Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Patents, although the Statute of Monopolies had spoken of “any
manner of new manufactures within this realme” and of “the true and first
inventor and inventors of such manufactures,” it nowhere spoke of “the invention.”166
The term “inventive step” appears first to have been used by Lord
Justce Fletcher Moulton in 1908 in the course of his Lordship’s judgment in
the English case of British United Shoe Machinery Company Ltd. v. A.
Fussell & Sons Ltd., a case dealing with a challenge to the novelty of a
claimed new combination of known integers, and thus cannot be traced back
to the Statute of Monopolies.167 In 1894, Master of the Rolls Lord Esher
responded in The Edison Bell Phonograph Corporation v. Smith and Young
to a submission that one of the claims of the patent in suit was wanting in
subject matter:

163. The contemporary requirements of patentability are that an invention must fall within one or more of the four categories of patentable subject matter enumerated in 35 U.S.C. §
101, be novel, be non-obvious, and be useful. See supra note7. The invention claimed must
also be described in sufficient detail and enabled so that one with ordinary skill in the subject
matter of the patent can make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2015).
164. Although the 1474 Venetian patent statute required that an invention be “ingenious,”
indicating a need for inventiveness, this requirement does not seem to have been imported
into English patent law until much later. See Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 3), supra note
34, at 800; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 707.
165. R D Werner & Co Inc v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (1989) 25 FCR 565 at
573–575, 595–99 (Austl.).
166. (1959) 102 CLR 252, 268–69 (Austl.)
167. (1908) 25 R.P.C. 631 at 653 (Eng.).
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Now, whenever I hear the objection taken to a patent which has been
used, which has been bought and sold, which has been therefore treated
by men of business as a useful thing, that it is wanting in subject-matter,
I look upon it, I confess, with an amused contempt. . . . It really comes to
this, that although the invention is new—that is, that nobody has thought
of it before—and although it is useful, yet, when you consider it, you
come to the conclusion that it is so easy, so palpable, that everybody who
thought for a moment would come to the same conclusion; or, in more
homely language, hardly judicial, but rather businesslike, it comes to
this, it is so easy that any fool could do it. Well, I look, as I say, upon
that objection, when all others have failed, generally with amused contempt.168

It was not until the enactment of the Patents and Designs Act of 1907
that a statutory distinction was drawn between novelty and obviousness in
the United Kingdom. It was not until The Patent Act of 1952 that the United
States169 and Australia followed suit.170 The High Court of Australia has explained that “raising the threshold of inventiveness” in this way was appropriate to balance inventors’ need for encouragement with the public’s need
to access information:171
The emergence of the independent requirement for an inventive step,
first in case law, then in legislative requirements for patentability as occurred in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, has always reflected the balance of policy considerations in patent law of encouraging and rewarding inventors without impeding advances and improvements by skilled, non-inventive persons.172

168. (1894) 11 R.P.C. 389 at 398.
169. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2015). This provision has no statutory precursor and replaced the
judge-made case law requiring that an invention be disclosed before a patent could be granted. See Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 405–06
(1960). The common law origins of the non-obviousness principle are said to lie in Hotchkiss
v. Greenwood, a case in which the invention related to an old method of making doorknobs
whereby the doorknob had a certain shaped hole for the fastening of a shank, and the only
difference was that the inventor substituted a clay or porcelain knob for a metallic knob.
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 248–49 (1850). The Court described the difference as
formal and destitute of ingenuity and invention. Id. at 266.
170. Patents Act 1952 (Cth) (Austl.) s 100(1) (e); Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v
Doric Products Pty Ltd (No. 2) (2007) 235 CLR 173, 192–93 (Austl.); The Grain Pool of
Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 504 (Austl.).
171. Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd (No. 2) (2007) 235
CLR 173, 194 (Austl.).
172. Id.
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III. CONSIDERATION OF PHYSICALITY IN PATENT LAW’S HISTORY
From its earliest days, the commercial and technical innovation requirements of the patent system have been about giving the public access to
new technologies. The history of the patent system reveals a 500-year-old
innovation policy dating back to the Venetian Republic designed to promote
innovation, prosperity, employment, and knowledge transfer.
While the Venetian patent statute of 1474 makes explicit reference to
the introduction of new devices, the pre-Statute of Monopolies practice of
issuing patents demonstrates nothing that ties the patent incentive to physical creations. Rather, we see an incentive to introduce new industries and
trades (described as “manufactures”) to the realm. This practice continued
under the rule of Queen Elizabeth I and James I, but not without alleged
abuses of the privilege, which were brought to the fore in Darcy v. Allen173
and ultimately banished sometime after the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies. That the subject matter for which the Crown might grant a patent
was broad is clear in the language in which Darcy v. Allen is described and
in the report of The Clothworkers of Ipswich, which links the patent incentive to the introduction of any new trade into the realm, either by way of
importation or invention.174 From the descriptions of patentability in these
documents, it seems inconceivable that a patent granted for a new trade at
that time would have been invalid if it involved the use of a method that did
not operate upon a physical object when invoked.
We see in the Statute of Monopolies no intention to place no fetters on
the scope of patentable subject matter so that the patent incentive would be
available to encourage the introduction of any new trades and manufactures
that might benefit the realm. Although the Statute of Monopolies may have
outlawed odious monopolies, it said nothing of the types of subject matter
that would qualify for a patent or restrictions on the scope of patentable subject matter. Its language certainly does nothing to impose a physicality requirement.
Instead, the focus of the Statute of Monopolies is newness; the statute
was enacted to ensure that monopolies were not granted in respect of existing industries or trades that were known in the realm so as to prevent abuse.
In the Industrial Age cases that were decided after the Privy Council
divested itself of the jurisdiction to hear patent matters and passed that jurisdiction to the common law courts in 1752, a line of authority begins in the
opinion of Chief Justice Eyre in Boulton and Watt v. Bull employing a similarly broad view of the subject matter for which a valid patent might be

173. (1603) 11 Eng. Rep. 84b.
174. (1615) Eng. Rep. 252 at 254 (Eng.).
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granted.175 Evident in that line of cases is an understanding of the concept of
an invention as being something independent of its manifestation or form.
This is the basis upon which the courts’ early understanding of the concept
of invention permitted the recognition of non-physical processes as patentable subject matter, and these cases set the scope of patentable subject matter.
That scope conveys no place for a physicality requirement in the context of
patentable subject matter and that a lack of physical embodiment in an invention is not to be equated with a claimed invention being a mere abstract
or philosophical principle.
When the first United States Patent Act came into being in 1790, it was
“derived from the principles and practice which have prevailed in the construction of that of England.”176 While it may have been unclear as to
whether improvements to existing products or processes that did not involve
the creation of a new machine or device were patentable in England, the
enumerated categories of statutory subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101 make
clear that the scope of patentable subject matter was intended to be broad
and encompassing, as recognized in modern cases such as Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.177
This article argues that this broad conception of invention is something
independent of the subject matter’s material form. This argument is as relevant today as it was at the time of Boulton and Watt v. Bull, Hornblower v.
Boulton, and The King v. Wheeler. Furthermore, that broad concept of invention was replicated in the United States by framers who intended to improve the English system by ensuring that the scope of patentable subject
matter would be less restrictive.
The history of the patent system demonstrates that its original focus on
the production, use, and alteration of physical artifacts is a by-product of
dated notions of technology, and this does not mean the patent incentive was
intended to be so limited.178 Nothing in patent system history definitively
states that the patent incentive was ever limited to inventions of a physical
nature. Instead, patent law history supports the development of mercantilist
175. See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463, 494–96 (Eng.).
176. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829).
177. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980) (“Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the
sun that is made by man.’”).
178. Erik S. Maurer, An Economic Justification for a Broad Interpretation of Patentable
Subject Matter, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (2001) (“When people think of patented inventions they probably think about well-tooled, oily parts that make machines run – something
they can put their hands on, weigh with dead reckoning, and intuitively understand.”); Robert
P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 585 (1999) (“At the
very least, for Jefferson, if you put technology in a bag and shook it, it would make some
noise.”).
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and developmental aims. Imposing a physicality requirement is in no way
consistent with and does nothing to advance those aims.
The historically justified alternative to using such bright-line criteria is
deciding subject-matter eligibility by reference to the simple question of
whether a claimed invention reduces a scientific principle, natural phenomena, or idea to a specific and useful practical application. This approach allows novelty, non-obviousness, and adequacy of disclosure to play a greater
role in determining whether a patent should issue in respect of a particular
invention.179
This technology-neutral approach to patent eligibility has been adopted
in the drafting of Article 27.1 of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS Agreement”).
Like the Statute of Monopolies that preceded it, the TRIPS Agreement does
not define “invention” and does not distinguish between patentable inventions issuing from the laws of science, natural phenomena, and abstract discoveries. It instead requires that patents “shall be available for any inventions . . . in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step[,] and are capable of industrial application.”180 This historically
consistent approach recognizes that patent law is about achieving an appropriate balance between the need to provide private rights sufficient to encourage innovation and the public’s right to use and build upon existing
ideas.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the focus of the patent system has historically been on the production and manipulation of physical artifacts that are the domain of industry, chemistry, and engineering, the history of patent law and practice does
not support the view that patent law’s incentive function is in fact limited to
promoting innovation in these fields. Instead, the history of patent law, from
the Venetian patent statute of 1474 to the adoption of a patent system in the
United States, supports a broad view of patentable subject matter, free of
artificial fetters such as a physicality requirement.
The patent system has always been about creating incentives to innovate, to bring new products and processes to market, and to disclose new
technologies to the public. The incentives have always been limited in duration to enable others to learn and use the technology without restriction once
179. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, 112(a) (2015).
180. World Trade Organization [WTO], General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade – Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, at Art. 27, Document
MTN/FA, (December 15, 1993), reprinted in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADEMULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
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the exclusivity period has come to an end. This is entirely consistent with
the notions that innovation is the production of new information,
knowledge, and ideas and that technology is little more than the application
of information or knowledge to do new things. It is the process of creating
better and more useful information. It is entirely consistent with the notion
of information being an ordinary material good that is both an input and a
product of the innovative process.
Given the nature of innovation in the Information Age and the relationship it bears with the incentives to innovate and invest in innovation that
patent law provides, it makes little sense to limit the scope of patentable
subject matter by introducing a physicality requirement. Because the innovation promoted by the patent system is nothing more than the creation of
new knowledge and ideas and is not contingent on the creation of new machines, physical devices and transformative methods, its progress will not be
served well by limiting the scope of patentable subject matter to traditional
manufacturing and physicality-based industrial technologies.

